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Manipulation of three-dimensional objects affords children learning opportu
nities that are less available in situations that involve purely verbal or written
communication (Rogoff, 1990).As discussed in other chapters in this volume,
and in the education literature more broadly, the opportunity to touch and
interact with objects is often very helpful for young children as they attempt
to understand abstract concepts or processes. Inspired by Piaget's theory (d.
Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), psychologists and education researchers have pos
ited various concrete-to-abstract shifts in children's thinking. For aample,
whereas preschool-aged children understand perceptually based analogies,
older children understand analogies based on more abstract relational features
(Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996). Educational methods have often been.developed
with such concrete-abstract shifts in mind. The manipulative materiahi used
in early mathematics classrooms, for example, have long been considered es
sential aids in communicating abstract principles to young children. The use
fulness of concrete objects as tools for abstract thought is not surprising,
given young children's connection to the sensory reality of the here-and-now.
In this chapter, however, we focus on a growing view that concrete objects do
not always improve children's. understanding of abstract ldeas. andJn fact,
that the sensory properties of certain objects, "representational objects," can
even pose an obstacle to learning (Uttal, Uu,& Del..oache, 1999).
A representaUonal object is an object in its own right, but it is also in
tended to be used as a symbol for some otherentity (what we call the referent
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object). For adults, some representational objects, such as maps and scale
models, are easy to think of in that way becaus~ they are clearly concrete oiJ..
jects, and their function as representations is also clearly understood by most
people who use them. There are other representational objects, however, that
may be less obriously thought Qf ~ both objects and representations. Pho
tographs and videotapes, for example,
not usually thought of as objects in
themselves. Instead, they are··extremely transparent representations and im
mediately bring to mind the objects, people, and scet~es that they depict. In
this chapter we later consider three features of representational objects that
may help to chamcterize the range of variation in this class of objects: repre
sentational objects can vary in their salience as objects, in their similarity to
the referent object, and in their familiarity to the user.
Although some representational objects, such as maps and globes, are very
commonly seen in children's homes and classrooms, several areas of research
suggest that chlldren may not understand that these objects are meant to be
symbols.Without seeing them as symbols, children cannot possibly use these
objects to improve their understanding of the objects that they represent.
Del..oache and her colleagues (DeLoache, 1995; Del..oache & Marzolf, 1992)
have shown, in a comprehensive program of research, that representational
objects can often hinder young children's ability to solve problems concern
ing the objects that they represent. In her most famous work, DeLoache
(1987, 1991) asked whether young children can use a scale model of a room
(akin to a dollhouse) to reason about the hiding place ofan object in a full-size
(but otherwise identical) room. Children. see a small Snoopy dog hidden in
the scale model·, and they are then asked to find the large Snoopy in the same
place in thefull-scale room. It is not until 3 years of age that children are con
sistently successful in using the information provided in the scale model to
reason about.the location of the referent object (DeLoache, 1991). Beyond
the preschool years,Uben and her colleagues (e.g., Uben & Yekel. 1996) have
shown that once children understand the symbolic nature of representational
objects, such as mapsJ there is still a great deal of development needed be
fore they fully understand the meaning of various components of the repre
sentations.
Del.oache's and Liben's findings raise questions about why young children
find representational objects so challenging to understand. DeLoache (2000)
suggests that children may have trouble achieving "dual representation," in
other words, they may not initially be able to think of objects simultaneously
as both objects in their own right and as representations for something else.
Because the physical reality of these objects is so salient to young children,
it may be difficult for them to get past that physical reality to reason about
the thing that the object represents. Thus, Del.oache's work documents a
striking developmental shift in children's understanding of representational
objects; however, the source of that developmental change is less clear.
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To investigate the mechanisms underlying the developmental transition
that DeLoache has uncovered, it is important to consider the social cont~s
in which children experience representational objects. The importance of
the social context is suggested by Tomasello (1999), who argues that because
representational objects are a kind of cultural tool, observations of or inter
actions with other people may be needed for children to learn the functions
intended for these objects.
The focus of this chapter is on exploring the role of children's everyday
social interactions in their developing understanding of representational ob
jects. In particular, the project focused on three types of representational
objects often found in museums and other settings: maps, globes, and video.
Representational objects are commonly used in museum exhibits, presum
ably because they allow visitors to explore objects that could not be literally
brought into the museum. For example, a globe encourages one to think about
the earth's properties and its place in the solar system. Various photographic
and videographic media bring the visitor information about objects and events
that would be difficult to view firsthand. Parent -child conversations around
these objects were investigated as fumilies interacted with them in the con
text of a han~n children's museum.We were particularly interested in gain
ing information about the everyday contexts within which children may
come to understand the links between these object-like representations and
their referents.
The following review of the literature focuses first on the possible role of
the social context in the development of dual representation, and then on
aspects of representational objects that seem to affect the likelihood that they
will be understandable to children.ln the subsequent sections,we discuss pre
vious research on three different types of representational objects relevant to
the museum exhibits we observed: maps and aerial photographs, globes, and
live video. Next we discuss our own research on three exhibits, each present
ing children with one of these types of representational object. Finally, we
consider implications and conclusions from this research.

SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILDREN'S EXPERIENCE
WITH REPRESENTATIONAL OBJECTS

How might parents guide children in coming to understand the complex and
abstract symbolic natwe of representational objects? To answer this question
it is important to investigate how parents and children talk about repRSenta
tional objects in museums as well asother informal settings. DeLoache (2000)
points out that because of their limited experience with symbolic artifacts,
children may need guidance from adults in order to even think of the possi
bility that something is meant as a symbolic object rather than an object in
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itself. As their experience with symbols increases, children an: likely to de
velop more "symbolic sensitivity" and have a greater ability to recognize the
symbolic nature of previously unencountered representational objects (De
Loache, 1995;DeLoache & Marzolf, 1992).
Because children's first reaction-may be to deal with representational ob
jects only as objects, parents may play an important role in helping children
to see the representational nature of these objects. To date, however, most re
search on children's understanding of representational objects has focused
on when children gain symbolic understandings, and not on how this under
standing emerges. Two recent studies have begun to uncover evidence regard
ing the potential influence of social interaction on children's developing un
derstanding. First, Troseth, Rozak, and Spry (1999) asked parents of 2-year-olds
to encourage their children's understanding that video images can represent
reality. They sent parents home with a camcorder for 2 weeks and suggested
that they use real-time recordings ofchildren's behavior to encourage children
to see links from their own behavior to the video image. After the 2-week pe
riod, Troseth et al. found that children who had this experience were more
successful than the control group on a task where they saw an object being
hidden on video and then were asked to find the object.1bis finding suggests
that familiarity with this particular use of video improved children's ability to
use video as a symbolic medium. 1bis research provides a first step toward
understanding the role of social interaction in the development of represen
tational insight. The next step is to ask more directly about the process by
which these experiences may influence children's understanding. In another
study, we have some pre1iminary evidence that adults' talk about representa
tional objects may contribute to children's understanding of video as a repre
sentationalmedium (Soennichsen & Callanan, 2001). Two-year-olds who heard
labels for the video images of objects and for their actual object referents
were more successful later at using the video to find a hidden object than
were those who saw the same video but did not hear object labels. From
these two studies, we have some preliminary evidence that, at least with
video, adult-child conversations may be helpful to children who are learning
about dual representation. The research reported in this chapter extends this
work by providing information about the dynamics of situations in which par~
ents and children discuss a variety of representational objects.
This project is influenced by Tomasello's (1999) analysis of the reasons
representational objects may be very difficult for children to understand.
Tomasello points out that representational objects are cultural tools and that
their intended symbolic nature may not be apparent to young children. In
making this point, Tomasello extends DeLoache's dual representation argu
ment, claiming that children may not only have difficulty decoupling the ma
terial and symbolic aspects of representational objects, but may also need
guidance in understanding the intentionally communicative affordances of
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such objects. Our hypothesis is that parents are not likely to directly teach
children about abstract concepts such as dual representation. Instead, parents
may talk with children about the meaning of specific representational ob
jects, treating the children as if they understand the bigger concept of sym
bolic representation. By helping children see that individual objects in spe
cific situations are symbolic objects, parents could be teaching children an
instance of the deeper notion of dual representation. We next consider three
features of representational objects that have been elaborated in previous
work: salience, similarity, and familiarity. With those features as a framework,
we evaluate this approach using family conversations about maps, globes,
and video.

THREE IMPORTANT FEATURES
OF REPRESENTATIONAL OBJECTS:
SALIENCE, SIMILARITY AND FAMILIARITY
As mentioned earlier, three aspects of the representation-referent relation
seem especially influential in terms ofchildren's appreciation of the symbolic
nature of representational objects. They vary in their salience as objects,which

can also be thought about as their "transparency" as representations. Pho
tographs are transparent,that is, they bring to mind the referent object and are
not salient as objects in and of themselves. Representational objects also vary
in similarity to the referent object, which may have impact on their recogniz
ability as symbols. They also vary in their typical familiarity to young children.
In a series of studies, Del..oache (1987, 1991) found that whereas 3·year-old
children performed well in tasks requiring representational understanding,
children only 6 months younger were not as successful. In subsequent stud
ies, Del..oache and her colleagues turned their focus toward systematically
identifying task variations that influence the age at which children demon
strate achievement of dual representation. Although Del..oache's findings
show that scale models are generally understood as representations by the
end of the preschool years, related work on globes (Vosniadou & Brewer,
1992) and maps (Liben, 1999) suggest that the developmental trajectory for
understanding representational objects continues well into the elementary
school years. Using Del..oache's research as a guide, Table 15.1 illustrates the
impact of the three features of salience, similarity, and familiarity, in relation to
children's understanding of different types of representational objects.

Salience ofRepresentational Object
First, Del..oache argued that the salience of the model as an object itself can
impede young children's ability to hold the dual mental images of object and
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TABLE 15.1

summary of DeLoache Findings as Rdevant
to Salience, Similarity, and Familiarity
Salient as an
Object?

Stmtlar to
Referent?*

Photographs

no

Video

no

yes
yes

Scale Models

yes

yes

Note.

Familiar as a

Representation?
yes
no (but f.uniUac in other form)
no

-varies across studies.

symbol in mind. In one study, increasing a model's salience as a concrete ob
ject (rather than a representation) by allowing children to play with it in a
nonsymbolic manner decreased the chances that 3-year-old children would
reason with it as a symbolic object (DeLoache, 2000). Conversely, placing the
model behind a glass window, and thus eliminating the possibility of playing
with it as an object, led to improved performance in finding hidden toys (De
Loache, 2000).
In further support of the importance of object salience, DeLoache found
that pictures are understood as representational objects at an earlier age than
other symbols. S~ence of a representational object can also be thought of in
terms of how "transparent" the object is as a symbol Pictures are quite trans
parent as representations; when parents point to a picture, for example, they
are likely to talk with children about -t he object depicted rather than about
the picture itself. As DeLoache's work with photographs suggests, to the de
gree that a representational object is transparent (and not salient as an object)
it may be easier for children to "see through" the symbol to the referent (cf.
Ittelson, 1996). Two-and-half-year-olds are able to use pictures as representa
tions of objects, yet are unable to use scale models in the same manner (De
Loache, 1991,2000).
Similarity Between Representational Object
and Referent

Another important feature of representational objects is the degree to which
they are similar to their referents. DeLoache varied the similarity of represen
tation and referent and found important effects (DeLoache, Kolstad, & Ander
son, 1991). For example, when physical similarity between a scale model of a
room and the actual room was increased by making the rooms similar in size,
even 2-year-old children were able to successfully understand the model
room relationship. Liben (1999) also discusses the idea that representations
that closely resemble their referents come close to "re-presenting" the refer
ent, therefore the connection may not be as difficult to comprehend as that
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between a referent and a representation that are less similar. Iiben andYekel
(1996) found that children were better able to make map-room connections
with maps in which the depicted objects more closely represent their refer·
ents (oblique maps), than with more abstract "plan" maps (with overhead or
aerial perspective). Thus, children have an easier time understanding repre·
senU~:tional objects that have a high degree of similarity to their referents.
Similarity of a representational object to its referent is only helpful, how·
ever, if comparisons between the two can be made. Some representational
objects that are commonly used by adults have referents that are not easily
compared to the representation. Both maps and globes, for example, have ref·
erents that are not easily examined in their own right, namely specific geo
graphical regions in the case of maps and the entire earth in the case of the
globe. In these cases, children are likely to have a harder time considering
the similarity between representation and referent. Extrapolating from De·
Loache's work, when the referent is not available for comparison, it should be
even more difficult for children to understand these representational objects.
Familiarity With Representational Objects
and Symbolic Experience
The third feature of representational objects that may affect how likely chil
dren are to understand them is their familiarity to children. Research has
demonstrated that children's ability to engage in spatial reasoning tasks is
influenced by their familiarity and comfort with the testing space (Acredolo,
1982). Troseth, Rozak, and Spry (1999) have also reported evidence that pre¥
schoolers' experience with video predicts their understanding of video as a
representation. Interestingly, however, just because representational objects
are familiar to children does not ensure that they are understood. Globes are
common in middle·income U.S. homes, yet Vosniadou and Brewer's (1992)
research suggests that children well into their school years have difficulty
with the notion that the earth is globe·shaped.
In addition to considering children's familiarity with particular representa·
tiona! objects, it is important to also consider their familiarity with those ob.
jects as symbols. Troseth and DeLoache (1998) discussed children's symbolic
experience as part of the explanation for why pictures become easier to use
as symbols between ages 2 and 2lh years. Children's typical experience with
video may actually act against their understanding of video as symbolic. Be·
cause they see video mostly as a medium through which to view movies or
previously recorded events, it may be difficult for children to interpret video
as a representation of an actual ongoing event. As mentioned·earlier, Troseth
et al. (1999) found that parentS were able to provide their 2·year~lds with
experience that helped them understand video as a representation. Further,
there is evidence from both DeLoache's (e.g., Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994) and

268

CALLANAN, JIPSON , AND SOENNICHSEN

Liben's (e.g., Liben & Yekel, 1996) laboratories that children's experience
with a simpler form of representation can transfer to more complex sorts of
representations. This suggests that familiarity or experience seems to be an
important factor in children's symbolic understanding.
In our research, we explored parent-child conversations about three mu
seum exhibits that centered around representational objects varying in their
salience, similarity, and familiarity. In the following sections, we consider re
search on children's understanding of each of the three types of representa
tional objects explored in these exhibits: maps, globes, and video. We then
present our findings on how parents talk with their children about each of
these representational objects.

MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS
AS REPRESENTATIONAL OBJECTS

Oeloache's work with scale models points to the difficulty that children have
in conceptualizing something as an object (e.g., a dollhouse) and a symbol at
the same time. Dual representation applies to maps and photographs as well.
The first exhibit we examined was a set of aerial photographs and matching
maps of several neighboring towns surrounding the museum. In this exhibit
the representational objects are the photographs and maps, with the referent
being the streets, buildings, and parks depicted. The maps and photographs
were arranged along a wall with the maps mounted vertically on the wall and
the matching aerial photographs mounted below them on an angled counter
like table. Each photograph was covered in plexiglas with a movable dome
shaped magnifying glass attached.
With regard to the three features of representational objects, the maps and
aerial photographs were considered to be relatively low in salience. Table 15.2
presents an analysis of how the exhibits we studied compare to OeLoache's
exhibits on these three dimensions. Although in other settings maps may be
salient objects in their own right, the particular exhibit under investigation
TABLE 15.2

Summary of Observed Exhibits as Relevant
to Salience, Similarity, and Familiarity

Ideal (based on DeLoache)
Maps & Aerial Photos
Globes
Video

Salient as an
OV}ect?

Similar to
Referent?

Familiar as a
Representation?

no
no
yes
no

yes
difficult to assess
difficult to assess
yes

yes
no
yes? (confusing?)
no
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here was arranged such that paper maps were placed on a wall over a counter
and were, therefore, inaccessible for children to physically manipulate. The
aerial photographs were similarly unavailable as they were placed under Plex
iglas. Thus, museum visitors were not likely to find these particular maps and
aerial photographs to be salient as objects. The decreased salience of these
representational objects should, according to DeLoache (2000), enhance
their symbolic attributes.
Consideration of how similar maps are to the spaces that they represent
suggests that despite swface similarities, the relationship is quite abstract.
Although the aerial photographs in the exhibit directly represent actual geo
graphical spaces, they are novel types of photographs and the perspective
taken is one that tends to be unfamiliar to children. In a study of children' s
interpretations of aerial photographs, for example, children identified tennis
courts as "doors;' refused to accept a rectangle as an office building because
buildings are bigger, and failed to find grass on the black-and-white image be
cause "grass is greenn (liben & Downs, 1989). Thus, the buildings and streets
that are represented in the aerial photographs are difficult to recognize from
overhead views, making these photographs more like maps and less like pho
tographs of canonical objects. In addition, the size differences between the
representations and the spaces they depict is considerable, thus decreasing
the similarity between the two and making it impossible for children to com
pare the map to its referent space except by using their memory for the space.
Finally, regarding the familiarity of maps and aerial photographs, different
families were likely to have had varying experience with these kinds of rep
resentational objects. In general, it was anticipated that most parents would
be very familiar with maps and relatively unfamiliar with the aerial photo
graphs. In addition, because the museum in which this study was conducted
attracts families visiting from other parts·of the country and other parts of the
world, families were expected to vary in the extent to which they found the
depicted spaces to be familiar. Thus, the aerial photography exhibit, in partic
ular, is unique in that parents may not be very furniliar with either the medium
of symbolic representation or the referents.
Children's understanding of representations of space (e.g., maps, aerial
photographs, scale models) has received a great deal of research attention,
particularly by Liben and her colleagues. In general, studies in this area sug
gest that by the time children enter preschool, they demonstrate an apprecia
tion of the symbolic nature of maps. This understanding is remarkable in that
preschoolers must come to think about a physical object (e.g.,a map) as also
having a symbolic functiont what DeLoache (1995) referred to as atta,ining
representational insight. Uben (1999), hOwevert made the point that under
standing maps as representing physical spaces is but the first step in gaining
competence in map use. Many children who have made this step go on to re
veal misunderstandings in map interpretation. For example, Uben & Downs
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(1989) reported that severn.l preschool children in their studies overextended
the physical properties of maps to the referent (and vice versa), as in the case
of one child who inferred that a road shown in red on a map meant that the
actual road would be red.
Despite these misunderstandings, preschool children have been shown to
successfully use maps in a variety of ways. In some situations, for example,
they are able to use maps as sources of information as to the location of hid
den objects (Uttal, Lio, & Taxy, 1995), and as tools to accelerate their learning
of a route through a playhouse (Uttal & Wellman, 1989). Further, Liben and
Yekel (1996) found that 4¥.z- to 5~-yeac-olds were able to reverse their repre
sentational understanding and use their knowledge of a familiar room to in
terpret a map of the room. Interestingly, this last study revealed that all maps
are not created equal. Children had an easier time making the room-map
connection when presented with an oblique map (in which depicted objects
resemble their referents) than when shown an overhead map. This finding
reinforces DeLoache's argument that the use of symbolic information is facil
itated when representation and referent are physically similar (DeLoache,
Uttal, & 'Pierroutsakos, 1998).

GLOBES AS REPRESENTATIONAL OBJECTS
FOR THE EARTH
Globes are another type of representational object for which children must
use dual representation to understand the link from the globe to the earth.
Because globes are very common cultural artifacts, one might think that chil
dren understand their function from an early age. Research on children's
understanding of the shape of the earth, however, suggests that the dual rep
resentation problem is very difficult in this case as well (Vosniadou & Brewer,
1992). The second museum exhibit we investigated was called "Digging to
China."The exhibit consists ofa large globe (representing the earth) equipped
with two small video cameras that display opposite sides of the earth. An ac
companying video monitor presents the images from both cameras. Visitors
use controls to find a spot on the globe, look at that image on the monitor,
and then look at the other image to see what spot on the globe is at the exact
opposite point. The idea is that you can find out where you would end up if
you could dig through the earth (as in the phcase"digging to China.")
Compared with the scale models in DeLoache's research, globes are per
haps equally salient as objects and considerably more familiar as cultural arti
facts. They are also regarded by adults as quite similar to their referents. This
similarity may be lost on children, however, as suggested by a large body of
research in developmental psychology and education that shows that even
children as old as 7 years of age have difficulty truly understanding that the
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earth is a sphere (e.g., Nussbauni. & Novak, 1976;Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).
This research suggests that, despite their exposure to globes as artifacts, chil
dren may not understand globes as symbols. Direct evidence on this point is
not available, however.
In contrast to the research attention given to children's understanding of
maps of physical space, children's understanding ofglobes per se has received
little attention from researchers. One reason for this oversight may be that the
symbolic relationship between a globe and the planet Earth is so obvious to
researchers that the question of whether children appreciate the connection
has been overlooked. Educators ofyoung children may also overestimate their
understanding of the globe as a symbol for the earth. In this section, we dis
cuss prior research that suggests that an appreciation of the symbolic rela
tionship between globes and the earth may be quite difficult to attain.We first
present findings that suggest that young children may encounter difficulties in
considering globes to be representational objects in addition to being inter
esting objects themselves.We then discuss research indicating that children's
limited understanding of the earth itself may impede successful mapping of
the. globe-to-earth relationship. Thus, making the symbolic connection be
tween globes and the earth may be challenging for any of three reasons: abil
ity to achieve representational insight; ability to interpret the representational
object (globe) as symbolic; and understanding of the referent (earth).
The work of Del..oache and her colleagues offers valuable information re
garding the emergence of representational insight, as discussed earlier. In her
work with scale models, photographs, and videos, DeLoache (1995) generally
found that children's understanding ofthe symbolic link is available by 3 years
of age. Children's confusion about the shape of the earth continues much
later, however. Therefore, it is interesting to consider whether the globe as a
symbolic object may be very challenging for children to use to gain informa
tion about the earth's shape. In everyday life, children may be likely to treat
globes as objects in and of themselves and internet with them nonsymboli
cally. Unlike maps or photographs, which tend to be treated by parents and
children primarily as representational objects (Liben, 1999),globes are partic
ularly salient and interesting in their own right (e.g., they are colorful, fun to
spin). Thus, depending on individual experiences, globes may first be consid
ered to be amusing playthings and the insight that they are representational
may be delayed.
Another possible obstacle to appreciating globes as models of the earth
may lie in children's incomplete knowledge of the earth itself. Liben (1999)
suggested that understanding the referent is essential to understanding repre
sentations. For example, she suggested that a child's difficulty interpreting a
clover-leaf intersection on an aerial photogmph is likely to be due to limited
knowledge of clover-leaf intersections, mther than an inability to interpret
the representation.We know that the degree ofsimilarity between a symbolic
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object and its referent influences the success with which children are able to
demonstrate representational insight (Del..oache et al., 1991).However, if chil
dren do not understand enough about the earth's shape to appreciate the
physical similarities between a globe and the earth, it will be extremely diffi
cult to make a representational link between the two.
Research examining children's mental models of the earth suggests that
many children do not, in met, initially consider the earth to be a sphere. In
stead, studies in this area converge to show that children initially construct
ideas about the earth based on information gained through perceptual expe
riences (e.g., the earth is flat). With time, however, children demonstrate at
tempts to merge their initial understandings with the scientific idea ofa spher
ical earth and develop a variety of alternative models of the earth (e.g., flat
disc, hollow earth, dual earth theory, flattened sphere; for a description of
these alternative models see Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). These "synthetic
models" reflect children's attempts to resolve inconsistencies between their
own perceptual experiences and information given to them by others (e.g.,
teachers, parents, other children).lt is not until children are 10 or 11 years of
age that they seem to have fully accepted the scientific model of a spherical
earth (e.g., Nussbaum & Novak, 1976; Sneider & Pulos, 1983; Vosniadou &
Brewer, 1992).1bis research is crucial in that children who do not understand
the earth to be a sphere may find it more difficult to understand the relation
ship between a globe and the earth, regardless of their representational skills.

VIDEO AS A REPRESENTATIONAL OBJECT

The third exhibit we investigated as part of this project uses video as its sym
bolic medium. In this exhibit, while a model train goes around a track, a cam
era mounted on the train's engine sends a video image to a monitor.The video
monitor is in a booth that looks like a stylized train engine. Children watch
the monitor while controlling the movement of the small model train. Dual
representation is embedded in this exhibit because children can respond to
the video as an entity of its own or as a representation of the objects that the
train "sees" as it goes around the track.
Real-time video is clearly not very salient as an object, hence it should be
easier for children to achieve dual representation with video than with.three
dimensional objects. In fact, Troseth and Del..oache's (1998) work has shown
that 2-year-olds find it quite difficult to use information conveyed via video in
their Snoopy hiding task, but that, similar to their perfonnance with pictures,
children begin to use video in a symbolic fashion between 24 and 30 months.
Similarity between representation and referent is very high with video. In
the case of the train exhibit, the similarity between the objects on the moni
tor and the three-dimensional objects that they represent is extremely high.
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Further, the similarity is there for children to perceive firsthand. This contr.lsts
with both the map and globe exhibits, where the referents are not available in
the exhibits themselves.
The role of familiarity is also evident in children's developing understand
ing of the representational nature of video. It is likely that between the ages of
24 and 30 months children gain experience with video as a symbolic medium.
Troseth and DeLoache (1998) pointed out that although many 2-year-olds
have certainly been exposed to video, it is usually in the context of entertain
ment and make-believe. This may make it difficult for young children to con
sider video as something that can represent reality. As mentioned earlier,
Troseth et al.'s (1999) study, as well as our own preliminary findings (Soen
nichsen & Callanan, 2001) suggest that children's conversations with parents
may provide experience that contributes to children's ability to use video as a
symbolic medium.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
M~PS, GLOBES, AND VIDEO
The main goal of this study was to explore parents' talk with children about
representational objects to gain information on the process by which chil
dren might learn about symbolic relationships. In addition, we asked about
whether children were jointly engaged with parents during these interactions.
To do so,we examined 126 interactions between children and parents at the
Children's Discovery Museum in San Jose, California, a hands-on children's
museum (see Crowley & Callanan, 1998). Forty-two parent-child interactions
were coded at each of the three exhibits. At each exhibit, half of the target
children were aged 4 years or younger, and the other half were aged 5 and
older. These age groups were selected due to our desire to compare the con
versations parents have with children who are not yet in school to those of
parents with school-aged children. These data were collected as pait of a
larger study of children's learning in museum settings (see Crowley, Callanan,
Jipson, Galco, Topping, & Shrager, in press; Crowley, Callanan, Tenenbaum, &
Allen, 2001). Families were approached as they entered the museum, informed
about the research, and invited to participate. Families who agreed to partici
pate were given age-coded stickers for their children to wear.When children
with stickers approached targeted exhibits, video cameras were turned on.
This project included only children who visited with one or both parents.

Coding ofInteractions
In our analysis of these conversations, we first asked whether parents dis
cussed representational objects in ways that might reveal the link between

representation and referent. One strategy that parents might use to explain
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the representational nature of maps, globes, and video is to explicitly point
out the representational link. We therefore identified cases where parents ex
plained the explicit link between the representational object and its referent.
For example,a parent at the train exhibit might say,"See the picture of the tree
on the TV? And there's the real tree over there!" This strategy might be partic
ularly helpful.in those cases where the similarity between a representational
object and its referent is not obvious or is not accessible, as in the case of the
link ·between the globe and the earth. Furthermore, if familiar representa
tional objects are used in unfamiliar ways, parents'discussions ofexplicit links
could help to clarify the situation. Knowing that their child is f.uniliar with
video that is not"live," for example, a parent might make a point of indicating
that this video is being shot at the present moment.
Even if parents do not expli.c itly explain the link between a representa
tional object and its referent, there are more subtle ways that they might
guide their children's understanding. In particular, parents might talk about a
representational object as if it were its referent. This kind of talk is very com
mon, for example,in conversations about photographs;parents often point to
a photograph saying,"There's Daddy!" even though literally speaking they are
pointing to a piece of paper rather than to the person depicted.We coded this
sort of" transparent" taik about the referent, differentiating it into two subcat
egories. Parents might use specific labels for aspects of the referent with
which children are familiar. For example a parent might point to an aerial pho
tograph and say,"Look, there's your school!" Or they might use generic labels,
naming aspects of the referent that are less familiar to the child, for example
saying something like, "There's a river." Notice that if children do not under
stand the representational nature of the object, these sentences could seem
nonsensical. Such a child might think, for example, "How could a piece of
paper on the wall be my school?" Children who notice this contradiction, but
who are trying to make sense of what tlteir parents are saying, might begin to
understand that the map, globe, or video is a representation for something
else. We predicted that the specific label strategy might be more helpful than
the generic label strategy in guiding the child to see that the object being
discussed is a representational object. This is because children may be more
motivated to figure out why their parent is labeling a familiar object while
pointing to something else.
Finally, if none of these strategies were used, we coded the parents' speech
as not relevant to the symbolic relation between representation and referent.
This category also included interactions in which parents did not talk about
the exhibit. In addition to coding parents' talk about the representational
objects, we also asked about how children were engaging with their parents
and the objects during these interactions. We were particularly interested in
whether children seemed to be engaged in joint attention with their parents
as the representational objects were being discussed.
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TABLE 15.3
Percent ofParents at Each Exhibit Demonstrating Strategies

Maps

Globe
Video

Expltctt link

Specific

Generic

Not relevant

17
5
19

52

9

22

67

5
7

23

52

22

Frequencies ofCategories ofTalk
The frequencies with which parents used these different strategies are pre
sented in Table 15.3. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was conducted to ex
plore whether parents used all strategies equally. This analysis revealed that
parents did not demonstrate equal use of the four strategies (X 2 (3) = 75.21,
p < .001). Examination of these frequencies suggested that parents used more
specific-label strategies than other strategies. Further, when reanalyzing par
ents' strategy use by exhibit, we found thata similar pattern was true across all
three exhibits and that this pattern did not vary by children's age.
These results indicate that parents tended to talk about specific aspects of
the referent while interacting with the representational objects. Further, par
ents rarely offered explicit explanations of the relationship between the rep
resentational object and its referent. This pattern of results is consistent with
the prediction that although parents may not explain the abstract concepts of
dual representation to their children, they may guide children in achieving
particular instances ofdual representation.
Although they were rare, the conversations in which parents explained the
explicit link between representation and referent suggested that parents may
sometimes provide children with explicit information about representational
objects. For example, one parent pointed to the video image, saying, "You see
that? That's the picture that the train takes." He then pointed to the real train
and said,"And see, there's the real train right there." Another parent pointed to
an aerial photograph saying, "This is what it looks like when you're in an air
plane and you look down."
Salience, Similarity, and Familiarity

To further elaborate on patterns in parents' guidance, we return to the three
important features of representational objects discussed earlier-salience,
similarity, and familiarity- especially as they relate to these three museum
exhibits (see Table 15.2).First, the maps and aerial photographs exhibit pres
ents representational objects that are not particularly salient, so parent guid
ance is not likely to be needed on thatdimension. As might be expected, then,
parents rarely labeled the map or photo as an object itself. One exception was
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where a mother said, "This is a map of where Aunt Jenny lives." Much more
common, however, was the kind of"transparent" talk where parents pointed
to the image and labeled things as if the actual things were present, for exam
ple: "This is Hwy 101, the big road we drove down to get here," and "See,
there's our house."
The depictions on maps and aerial photographs are somewhat similar to
the objects they represent, but this similarity is difficult for children to assess,
partly because the referent objects are not available for inspection. Further,
the maps and aerial photographs are not likely to be familiar to children, or at
least they present an unfamiliar perspective. Therefore, parents' guidance on
the similarity and familiarity dimensions· seem potentially informative, as in
the following example:
Parent (pointing to aerial photograph): "Can you find our house? We're on
here. Right here."
Child: "Where?"
Parent: "This is where we are. Somewhere on here. Can you find our house?
Where's your school? This is a picture from the air.... There's the middle school
that you went to and right there is your house."
Child: "Oh cool!"

The parent's explanation that a map is, in a sense, "a picture from the air" may
help the child make the representation-referent connection by addressing
the unfcuniliarity of the perspective for the child.
A map is less similar to its referent than a picture or even a video image of
an object, and this disparity was evident in another parent's directive to her
child to see that "white dots" represent ponds at the map exhibit. The parent
pointed to the aerial photograph and explained, "See, those are where our
house is. See the pond? See our house is right there and see, those white dots,
those are the ponds:'
In contrast to the map exhibit, the salience of the representational object
as an object is particularly a problem for the globe exhibit. The globe is a com
pelling object and parents could potentially guide children in seeing it instead
as a representation for the earth. In our observations, however, we found that
parents tended to treat the globe as an object, and rarely seemed to help chil
dren see that it could also be thought of as a symbol for the earth. By treating
the globe not as a representation of the earth, but as an object in it~ own right,
a parent's behavior reflects an assumption of the child's understanding of the
earth-globe relationship, as in "See the globe that is showing where you are?"
Examining the data in Table 15.3 reveals that explicit links were particularly
rare in conversations about the globe exhibit. Parents may think that children
already understand globes as representations for the earth and that they are
not in need offurther explanation. As discussed earlier,Vosniadou and Brewer's
(1992) research suggests that this assumption on the part of parents may not
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be warranted. In a related study,Jipson (2000) explored parent- child conver
sations about the shape of the earth. Some of these conversations suggest that
parents assume that children understand the globe as a model of the earth,
and children's comments in those conversations also suggest that the assump
tion may be invalid. The following example from that study is from a 7-year
old's conversation with his parent during a part of the procedure where par
ent and child were asked to drnw the earth:
Chlld: Can you draw what ever however you want?
Mother: Yeah, you can do whatever you want.
Child: What color is it?
Mother: What? The earth? What color is the water?
Child: Blue.Where should I leave the house? Should I do it on this side?
Mother: Remember when we saw the globe and then there are some pans
that are green and some that are blue? And the green parts are land.
Child: Oh the globe doesn't live on the earth.
Mother: Who?
Child: The globe .
'Mother: The globe?

Later, the conversation continued when they were asked to show where two
children would live if one (John) lived in Australia and the other (Sally) lived
in California:
Mother: OK you want to show me on there on the globe?
Child: (points at quilt on wall) That's a globe?
Mother: No sweetie, right on the globe right there (points to globe on table).
Child: lbat's a globe?
Mother: Yeah, so show me on that where Sally and John live.
Child: Right here,see right there. (pointing to drawing)
Mother: No, but on that one.Where's Australia?
Child: (looking at globe) Australia, Australia, Australia, Australia, Australia, Aus
tralia, Australia.
Mother: So where does John live?
Child: John lives in Australia.
Mother: OK so put him there and put Sally in California.
Chlld: Can I see where California is? California is that big.
Mother: Yeah, so show me on the globe.
Chlld: (looks on globe) This?
Mother: Mm hmm.
Child:- This?

This conversation suggests that the mother is assuming some familiarity with
the globe on the part of her child, but the child seems somewhat confused.
If parents generally assume understanding that is not there, then familiar
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representational objects could elicit less explanation from parents and could
take longer for children to begin to understand.
Finally, the video exhibit presents children with a representational object
that is notatall salient (and arguably not even an object) and that is very sim
ilar to the referent. Consistent with our predictions, parents' talk about the
objects in the video rarely mentioned the video image itself. Instead the same
kind of tr.msparent labeling seen in the map exhibit was apparent here. Par
ents often pointed to the video image saying things like, "Look at the coins," or
"There's Daddy!"
Unlike the other two exhibits, the referent objects in the video exhibit are
present and available for comparison to the representation. This allowed par
ents to point out the similarity between the referent and the representation.
Parents talked about the video exhibit in ways that emphasized the link be
tween the representation and the referent, as in the following example:
Parent: "1bat's the train you're moving (pointing to the object). See thatone
right there?"
Chlld: (standing on his tip-toes to look at the object) "uh huh:'
Parent: "And this is what it looks like if you were the train conductor (pointing
to the object representation)."

Parents also often used the same term to refer to the object representation
(video image) and the object itself, perhaps helping children to recognize the
similarity between the two.
Mother. (pointing to the video image) "See, the train?" (then lifting the chit~
up so that she could look at the real train) "There, going around the track,
right there. See the train? Look down there.... See the train? It's coming out the
other side:•

Children's Engagement
In addition to coding parental strategies, we also coded whether children
were engaged in joint attention with their parents as the representational ob
jects were being discussed. Each parent-child dyad was coded as either being
jointly engaged or not at the time ofeach coded statement, and reliability was
assessed. The data on joint attention are presented in Table 15.4. Chi-square
analysis of the relationship between joint attention and parental strategy re
vealed that children's likelihood of being in joint attention with their parents
varied as a function of the strategies parents used (X 2 (3) = 15.44, p < .001).
Of children whose parent discussed a specific aspect of the referent, 90%
(65 out of 72) were in joint attention with the parent. There were fewer chil
dren whose parents talked about an explicit link, but they were also quite
likely to be in joint attention (88%, 15 out of 17). In addition, all of the
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TABLE 15.4
Number of Children in joint Attention as a Function ofParental Strategies

Joint attention
No Joint attention

Explicit link

Specific

Generic

Not relevant

15
2

65

9

7

0

17
11

children whose parents talked about a generic aspect of the referent were in
joint attention (9 out of 9), but 60% of the children whose parents talked
about nothing relevant were in joint attention (17 out of 28).
Joint attention is not an assessment ofchildren's understanding, and future
work on this topic is needed before we can understand the potential impact
of parents' strategies on children's understanding. Further, it is not clear
whether the strategies used by parents differentially encouraged joint atten
tion or whether children's attentiveness motivated parents' use of certain
strategies. This research does begin to suggest, however, that parents may be
providing information that is potentially helpful as children begin to under
stand that these objects are not just objects in their own right, but also repre
sentations.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR MUSEUM EXHIBIT DESIGN

The findings of this study are consistent with results from several related
projects (cailanan & Jipson, 2001) where we observed parents conversing
with their children about science in ways that focused on particular events
rather than on deeper abstract principles. These findings are also in line with
the work of Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, and Pappas (1998) on par
ents' talk with children about category membership of various natural and
human-made objects. Gelman et·al. found that parents used subtle cues such
as gestures to indicate shared category membership, but that they rarely gave
explicit explanations about underlying category structure. In his commen
tary on that work, Keil (1998) argued that it would perhaps be unproductive
for parents to give children too much detail about underlying scientific prin
ciples, and that it might be more appropriate to introduce children to the
general domain and then let them explore the details on their own.We are
beginning to formulate a model of how these ftagmenta.ry explanatory con
versations may impact children's learning. We argue that byfocusing on par
ticular events of interest in the moment, and providing fragments of informa
tion, parents may be laying the groundwork for children to eventually build
up coherent understanding of deeper principles.
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In the conversations analyzed beret parents talked to young children as if
the children understood representational objects for what they are. Although
deep explanations did not abound, we argue that there was some guidance
given that could help children to begin to attain dual representation. When
parents name the referent while pointing at a representational object, for
examplet we argue that children are being presented with a puzzle to be
solved. To make sense of what their parents are saying, they must come up
with a nonliteral way to interpret the label. This conflict may lead children to
begin to search for another way to think about the objects with which they
are interacting. These sorts of conversations could perhaps be important mo
tivation for the emergence of dual representation ability.
It seems possible that in some situations it could be unhelpful to children
to have adults treat objects as if they are already understood. A speculative
example is that the parents in our observations seemed to assume that their
children understand that globes are models of the earth. Given parents' as
sumption that this must be obvious, they do little to clear up the confusion
that results from the fact that the globe is a compelling object in its own right.
It is possible, then, that children's confusion about the shape of the earth may
not be helped by their exposure to globes, partly because globes may not be
recognized as representations for the earth. Further research on this point
should help to shed light on this issue.
Consistent with this point of view, and as mentioned at the beginning of
the chapter, DeLoache's original work is sometimes taken as evidence that
representational objects can hinder children's learning. Uttal, liu, and De
Loache (1999) argued that the use of interesting manipulative materials in
mathematics classrooms (e.g., Cheerios, marbles) may actually obscure ·the
·representational quality of those objects and make it more difficult for chil
dren to learn the abstract concept that is being represented. They cited Ste
venson and Stigler's (1992) research reporting on the use of manipulative ma
terials .i n Japanese math classrooms. Interestingly, a common practice in Japa
nese classrooms is to use the same manipulatives- simple tiles- throughout
the early school years; this consistency may help children to develop an
understanding of the representational nature of the objects. Uttal, Scudder,
and DeLoache (1997) suggested that the most effective concrete object for
encouraging learning is one that is interesting enough to hold a child's inter
est, but not so appealing that it ceases to have representation;ll qualities for
the child.
One contribution of the work presented here is to bring into focus not just
the nature of various representational objects, but also the nature of the social
interaction within which children experience these objects. The previous re
search reviewed here suggests that children are likely to appreciate the rep
resentational nature of photographs and videotapes by the time they reach
the preschool years. Representational objects that are more salient as objects,
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such as globes and maps, are likely to take several more years to be fully un·
derstood. Our research suggests that parents and others may be able to help
children understand the dual nature of these objects by talking about them
both as objects and as symbols for other (more abstract) objects.
Children's museums often contain many representational objects. These
exhibits may be designed without much background information regarding
children's understanding of the dual nature of such objects. Also, the philosa.
phy of museum design may not distinguish these objects from other sorts of
objects. Constructivist theories in museum settings, for example, may lead ex·
hibit designers to hide their intentions for exhibits, with the goal of encour·
aging open-ended exploration so that children can discover new affordances
of objects. Tomasello (1999) argued that children (and adults) respond to
human·made objects in terms oftheir''intentional affordances" as well as their
physical affordances. The idea is that we have expectations that human·made
objects have intended functions, and if they are not apparent to us, we may
be confused about how to approach the object. Tomasello's approach raises
intriguing questions regarding the interface of museum visitors' expectations
and designers' intentions (hidden or otherwise). Further, our findings suggest
that it may be beneficial to create opportunities for social interactions around
museum exhibits containing representational objects.
Although our studies took place in the context of a hands.on children's
museum, children's everyday lives are full of opportunities to explore and dis.
cuss representational objects with their parents. For example, when planning
a trip, parents and children may look at road maps together to discuss their
route. Or, when watching a video of a family gathering, parents and children
may talk about the people seen on the tape. Of course, the most common in·
stance of conversation around representational objects may be when parents
and children together look at picture books, labeling the objects they see
represented on the pages. Given the numerous representational materials of
use in day·ta.day living, our research easily extends to settings beyond chil
dren's museums. Children's conversations with parents serve as a setting for
children to figure out the notion of an object that serves as both object and
symbol.
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